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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

1 March 1951

SUBJECT: NIE-29: YUGOSLAVIA

(Paragraphs 1-6, Conclusions, as revised at meeting of IAC representatives 1 March 1951)

THE PROBLEM

To assess the capabilities and intentions of the USSR and its European Satellites with respect to action against Yugoslavia during 1951.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Kremlin aims eventually to eliminate the Tito Government, to replace it by a regime subservient to the USSR, and to integrate Yugoslavia politically, economically, and strategically into the European Satellite structure. However, the USSR in its treatment of the Tito problem has neither implicitly nor explicitly suggested that it must bring about the overthrow of the Tito regime at any cost or within any time period.

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2. It is unlikely that the Tito regime could be overthrown during 1951 by a Soviet-inspired coup or by internal revolt. Therefore, Satellite or Soviet-Satellite invasion would be necessary to achieve this end in 1951.

3. The continuing military build-up in the neighboring Satellite states (increase in armed forces, stockpiling, re-equipment, gasoline conservation, stepping-up of war industry, etc.) has reversed the previous balance of military strength between them and Yugoslavia and has created a Satellite capability to attack Yugoslavia with little or no warning.

4. Yugoslavia could not successfully defend itself against a sustained attack by the four neighboring Satellite powers (Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Albania), conducted under unified command and with full logistical support from the USSR. Guerrilla-type resistance, however, would continue after the collapse of formal military resistance.

5. Joint Soviet-Satellite forces could successfully invade Yugoslavia, overcome formal military resistance and eventually render guerrilla operations ineffective.

6. Yugoslav capabilities and morale are such that substantial Western assistance in military material would probably

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enable Yugoslavia to defend itself successfully against a Satellite attack, and even extend the period of resistance to a full-scale Soviet-Satellite attack. However, such material would have to be adapted to the special requirements of Yugoslav forces, and to be effective in the initial stages of an invasion would have to be delivered well in advance of hostilities and would have to be on a continuing basis.

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